

# **Iraqi-Iranian relations after 2003**

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**العلاقات العراقية الإيرانية بعد عام ٢٠٠٣**

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**جامعة بغداد - مركز التعليم المستمر**

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تحديد مستوى العلاقات الإيرانية العراقية بعد عام ٢٠٠٣ ، وتأثير سياسيا على إيران على قرارات السياسة الخارجية والداخلية العراقية ، وتغلغل إيران في الساحة السياسية والمجتمع العراقي ، وفهم المدى الذي وصلت إليه إيران والعراق. الولايات المتحدة تحقق أهدافها في العراق .. توافق المصالح السياسية المشتركة. تستند الدراسة إلى فرضية أن الاحتلال الأمريكي للعراق أدى إلى قيام إيران ، من خلال حلفائها السياسيين ، بزيادة نفوذها وسيطرتها على السياسة الداخلية العراقية ، وتحقيق مصالحها وأهدافها ، واكتساب القوة الإقليمية ، وبالتالي القيادة السياسية في العراق. مساحة. باستخدام المنهج التاريخي والتحليل في هذا الصدد ، يتيح لنا البحث: على افتراض صحة الافتراض ، عدا استخلاص عدة استنتاجات أهمها: أن الحرب الأمريكية على العراق ليست قانونية ، والولايات المتحدة لديها مصالح نفطية وسياسية في العراق لتطويق إيران وتقليص حجمها. نفوذها ، فتح الاحتلال الطريق أمام إيران للتخلي عن أجهزة الدولة العراقية والتسلل إليها والسيطرة على قرارات العراق السياسية الداخلية والخارجية ، وإن كانت هذه الاستنتاجات تستدعي عدة توصيات ، أهمها: مساعي الحكومة العراقية لتمير الانتخابات ، دستور وجديد تأتي الحكومة لإعادة بناء نفسها ، بعيداً عن التدخل الأجنبي ، بعيداً عن المحاصصة الطائفية ، وبناء ثقافة ضد العنف والطائفية ، وبناء علاقات حسن الجوار مع البيئة الإقليمية ، وخاصة إيران ، بشرط أن يكون الدافع وراء استقلال العراق. لا يؤثر على التدمير داخل النظام السياسي العراقي.

### .ABSTRACT

This study aims to determine the level of Iranian-Iraqi relations after 2003, the political influence of Iran on Iraqi foreign and internal policy decisions, Iran's penetration into the political arena and Iraqi society, and to understand the extent to which Iran and Iraq have reached. The United States is achieving its goals in Iraq... Common political interests are compatible. The study is based on the hypothesis that the American occupation of Iraq led to Iran, through its political allies, increasing its influence and control over Iraqi internal politics, achieving its interests and goals, and gaining regional power, and thus political leadership in Iraq. outer space. Using the historical method and analysis in this regard, the research allows us to: Assuming the validity of the assumption, except for drawing several conclusions, the most important of which are: that the American war on Iraq is neither legal nor legal and that the United States has oil and political interests in Iraq to encircle Iran and reduce its size. . His influence, the occupation opened the way for Iran to Although these conclusions call for several recommendations, the most important of which are: the Iraqi government's efforts to pass elections, with a new constitution and the government comes to rebuild itself, away from foreign interference, away from sectarian quotas, building a culture against violence and sectarianism, and building good neighborly relations, although these conclusions call for several recommendations, the most important of which are: the Iraqi government's efforts to pass elections, with a new constitution and the government comes to rebuild itself, away Independence is what it is. It has no bearing on the Iraqi political system's disintegration.

### Introduction.

Iran's attempt to control the state, choose an ideology and support its interests. This fact has created a common and complex inheritance, an inheritance formed by a mixture of sympathy, hatred, homogeneity, difference, common belonging, and contradictory identities. This relationship became dynamic according to the movement of internal politics and represented the building of the state, its ideological choice, and its self-interested affiliation.

For this reason, the Iranian policy towards Iraq was built on old foundations and could not be the result of a new theory that takes into account the reality in all its details, as the occupation of Iraq by the United States in April 2003 was an important factor in influencing Iranian policy on the internal and external levels and on the relationship between, the two countries. Iraq and Iran on the one hand, and Iran and the United States on the other.

After the United States launched its military attack on Iraq and toppled its regime in 2003, many political forces opposed to the former Iraqi regime entered as a result of this occupation, among which were forces that Iran embraced during Iran's war with Iraq since 1980-1988, led by the Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council. of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, Iran's interest in these villages increased before the war, which became almost certain, in the hope that these forces would be its allies in Iraq.

Iran has vigorously sought to harness the efforts of its foreign policies in influencing and putting pressure on Iraqi internal politics and interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq at various political, security, and economic

levels, by ensuring political success led by parties and political leaders loyal to Iran and acting as a proxy for Iran to control and control Iraq's geopolitical arena. and demographic.

After the occupation of Iraq and the fall of the former regime in 2003, Iran sought to achieve its interests and goals in Iraq through several strategies, including supporting armed groups and organizations, religious and military militias, and building economic relations with Iraq.

This study has brought us to the validity of the hypothesis, in addition to reaching several conclusions, the most important of which are: that the American war on Iraq was neither legitimate nor legal, and that America has oil and political interests in Iraq, encircling Iran and reducing the size of its influence, and that the occupation opened the way for Iran to interfere and penetrate the organs The Iraqi state and its rule.

In making internal and external political decisions for Iraq, while these conclusions necessitated several recommendations, the most important of which are: that the Iraqi government work to build itself anew, through elections, a constitution, and a new government far from foreign interference, and away from sectarian quotas, and establishing a culture against violence and sectarianism And building good-neighborly relations with the regional environment, especially Iran, with regard to Lats and Iran, where the volume of trade exchange jumped from 1.5 billion dollars in 2006 to 8 billion dollars in 2010, and Iranian exports to Iraq increased, and Iraq became a market for Iranian goods. As 20-33% of Iran's non-oil exports go to Iraq. The Iraqi-Iranian relations have begun to pose a threat to the stability of Iraq and the security of the region in general, at various political levels. The Iraqi-Iranian relations have begun to pose a threat to the security and stability of Iraq and the security of the region in general, at various political, security, and economic levels, and Iranian policy plays within an unknown preponderance of the balance of power. It is unknown to achieve interests in different ways, between standing by Iraq in its ordeal and interfering in its affairs to support its interests and pressure on it or on its land to protect its security from a danger that Iranian policy sees as it will come from the land of Iraq with the presence of the American occupation forces, which makes Iraq stand at a crossroads In light of the deterioration of the political, security and economic conditions and the prevention of progress and development, the achievement of its security and stability and the complete achievement of its sovereignty.

After the fall of the former Iraqi regime, a state of political vacuum was created. The space in Iraq is still suffering from its repercussions so far. It was natural for such a vacuum to raise fears in Iran that this vacuum, and the internal disturbances that may result from it, would affect internal conditions, and it seemed Iran has to face a period of possibilities that allow this vacuum: (Al-Alouji, 2007: 131).

The first: isthat a stable government loyal to the Americans and hostile to Iran will come to power in Iraq, which may pose a threat to the Iranian state and maybe a starting base against Iran. Denying that Iraq obtains a strong central government to prevent chaos and turmoil from moving to the border with Pran. The next is the presence of a stable and central Iraqi government with the capacity to transform Iran into execution, and the confrontation of the El Niño character of the cable state.

In light of these bad loads for Iran, it was necessary to blame Tehran not to achieve any of them, and to replace that by working to find a stable Iraqi government with a Shiite majority and a religious character. An Iraqi led by the Shiites constitutes an important pressure card between Iran in dealing with the United States. (J. Prawitz, 1996, 60-61.).

Iran was able to occupy Iraq practically and without political or military cost, and by some Iraqis themselves ceded the country to Iran. Iran did not interfere directly against the interests of the United States in Iraq.

This explains an important aspect, which is "the conspiracy theory, which indicates that there are prior security and intelligence agreements between the Iranian and American parties.

Al-Qaeda research divided this study into two sections.

The first topic: the objectives of the Iranian strategy for Iraq after the occupation.

The second topic: Iranian influence in the Iraqi political arena.

The first topic: the objectives of the Iranian strategy for Iraq after the occupation.

Iranian goals in Iraq after the occupation can be divided into political, security, religious and economic goals as follows:

First: Political objectives: Iran has worked to interfere in Iraqi affairs openly in order to provide political and security support to the elected government, as it seeks to establish a Shiite political system in order to crystallize the so-called.

B "The Shi'ite Crescent (Bayoumi, 2009: 67). Therefore, the leaders of the Iranian regime realized that they would need proxies in Iraq if the United States decided to stay or leave (Mustafa Ali, 2007, 45 K). Empowerment of a Shi'ite regime thus owes More friendship toward Iran is a core objective of Iranian strategy, so it supported its Shiite allies, shipped weapons to friendly militias, and incited against the American presence (Taqeh, 2007: 100).

Since 2003, Iran has been seeking to achieve three political goals in Iraq: (Sayed Khedideh, 2007, 23).

١. Iran is seeking to unify the Shiite parties in the country so that their demographic weight of about 60 percent of the total population of Iraq can be translated into political influence, and thus create a government that responds to Tehran.

٢. Iran "supported the crumbling ruling coalitions, positioning itself as an influential external mediator when any need to mediate arose.

٣. Tehran's attempt to "prevent non-Islamist parties from gaining power, and the Iraqi List in particular", and Tehran has marginalized the secular nationalist factions and leaders.

٤. Its attempt to prevent Islamic parties that are not loyal to Iran from gaining power, or trying to marginalize them and reduce their presence in Parliament, including the "Iraqi Islamic Party, which it believes is strongly capable of stopping its agendas in Iraq, and acting as a firewall to prevent Iranian penetration into the Iraqi arena, as it abandons foreign alien.

Al-Alouji (2007: 132) identifies some of Iran's strategies if the United States were to destroy the Iranian triangle after the occupation of Iraq, which are:

١. Influencing the political process in Iraq ensures the continuation of US involvement in Iraq for the longest possible period. And the necessity of eliminating the danger of regime change, by exhausting America in Iraq.

٢. Establishing strong relations with the various Iraqi forces to ensure their support in the event of any hostile US policies against Tehran.

Second: Security objectives: arming Shiite militias and Shiite and Sunni rebels

Also, training and financing them in order to be active towards inflicting a humiliating defeat on the United States in order to deter any further military intervention in the region. The exploitation of these Shiite and Sunni insurgent fighters to inflame sectarian tensions and fuel political violence, in order to then intervene diplomatically to resolve those conflicts, to later play the role of mediator in Iraq, where Tehran focused its resources on its traditional allies in the "Badr Corps" and expanded the scope of aid to include the "Mahdi Army." and even some Sunni insurgent groups from al-Qaeda (Prawitz and J, 2011, -146).

Third: Religious Objectives:

For Iran, Iraq represents a vital area for it, as it contains sacred thresholds, which it believes that it must be able to control those in charge of it and direct them according to the requirements of its national interests and the requirements of its political system. Therefore, Iran will not welcome the presence of a strong Iraqi regime that is based on Arabism or Islam that prevents it from making it an outlet for its ideology or makes it from containing the holy shrines.

- Subject to the political and religious gives the legitimacy of the system. (Al Aluji, 2005: 66). Iraq has become a destination for religious tourism for Iranian believers. Every month, about 40,000 Iranians begin to visit Iraq's holy cities, and about 3 million to 4 million Iranians are sent during the annual Ashura commemorations. As tomorrow - Najaf al-Ashraf - is in the process of emerging as an Iraqi political center for Iranian investment, which benefits Tehran's political allies in Iraq and gives the Iranians influence in this country. (Prawitz and J, 2011:148)

Fourth, the economic objectives:

Iran is working to consolidate commercial and economic relations with Iraq, for financial gain and commercial influence. The Islamic Republic of Iran has weakened Iraq's agricultural and industrial sectors by offering subsidized food products and cheap consumer goods in the Iraqi market. In addition to building dams, and diverting river courses that feed the Shatt al-Arab waterway, it has destroyed Iraqi agriculture in the south and hampered efforts to reform Iraq's marshlands (Lalouji, 2011: 148)

The researcher believes that things were going in Iraq after 2003 in favor of Iran after it became the only party almost entirely winning - perhaps not long from the current war, and Iraq will not be able to threaten Iran for years, perhaps longer, if not for decades to come, and the series is for years. Perhaps for a long time,

if not for decades to come, and the democratic process that America was keen to establish in Iraq only resulted in the rise of Shiite leaders.

They are more sympathetic to Tehran than to Washington and to the marginalization of other important political and demographic components in the formation of the Iraqi political map.

The second requirement: Iranian influence in the Iraqi political arena.

Although Iran has invested great resources to expand the framework of its influence in Iraq, it has achieved only mixed results. Relations between its Iraqi clients have been surrounded by tensions and violence from time to time, and Tehran has spent a lot of effort and time in playing a direct role, and managing problems that it had a role in its emergence. Tehran's interference in Iraqi politics has, from time to time, been a political obstacle for its local allies. (Prawitz and J, 2011: 149)

The penetration of Iranian influence in occupied Iraq began under a reformist president, "Mohammed Khatami", then increased and grew under his conservative successor, "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" because, for Iran, the issue of loosening the joints of power, society and the economy in Iraq is a basic guarantee that the scenario of the war of years will not be repeated. The eight. The conditions for influence and methods of intervention in post-occupation Iraq may be different, but the basis and goal of influence are the same. (Lalouji, 2009:33)

The concept of the framework of the meaning of Iranian influence in post-occupation Iraq can be expanded by dividing the influence work into sections, where Iran worked to achieve this influence, which is as follows: First: Supporting Political Allies: Iran tried to influence Iraq's political affairs by working with Shiite and Kurdish parties to establish a weak federal state dominated by Shiites and subject to Iranian influence. Its closest allies have urged the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Badr Organization (the militia of the former Majlis), and the party And the Dawa Party and the Sadrists, and in another period, to participate in political activities and in the formation of the institutions of nascent Iraq. (Lalouji, 2011: 145) Within the Iraqi arena, a political map of the new Iraq has emerged, with new forces of great diversity, contradictions, and sectarian and cultural contradictions, distributed among four prominent Shiite groups, namely:

١. The Movement of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq:

It was established in 1982 in Iran, with the aim of opposing the political system in Iraq, where the Council confirmed that its relationship with Iran is a relationship between two countries, as it is part of the new Iraqi government, and indicates that there is an Iranian character that dominates the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution to the degree that it raised fears among Many Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs themselves, and secularists from the council. This current gains its actual strength from its military wing with the presence of militias affiliated with it under the name "Badr Corps." It consists of about 10,000 thousand professional fighters (most of them soon became among the commandos of the Interior Ministry, the new Iraqi army, the National Guard, and the police). The exiled groups that lived in Iran as well as the Faili Kurds, and these groups are linked with Iran by cultural ties and derive their influence from popular culture, grew up in an atmosphere of admiration for the Iranian model. (Al-Rubaie, 48: 2006).

٢. The current of the Islamic Dawa Party:

It was founded in 1957 by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and the party continued to operate in Iraq until its activity was banned in 1980. After the assassination of its founder, Baqir al-Sadr, during the time of the former Iraqi regime, the party moved to Iran. Iran exerted pressure on him to join the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution during the Iran-Iraq war, and the party branched out in Tehran and Damascus, however, so the warlord Ibrahim al-Jaafari returned to Iraq after the fall of the Iraqi regime, to take over the presidency of the interim Iraqi government in 2005. (Welk, William, 2008: 21)

. 3 The Hawza stream in Najaf:

And who stands in the center without armed militias and without political control of the street. Its strength derives from traditional obedience to authority. It is composed of population blocs that have little interest in public affairs: clans, students, clerics, merchants, craftsmen, and employees. (Walk, William, 2008: 33).

٤ -Sadrism Current:

It is the current of the leader Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of the cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated in Iraq in 1999. Tehran is based on the same faith. The Sadrism movement strongly criticizes both the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution and the Dawa Party for their stay in Iran during Saddam Hussein's rule. (Lalouji, 2006, 102)

Iran and its relationship with the Kurds:

As for Iran's relations with the Kurds, Iran has also relied on its former political allies, the Kurds, in the days of the popular Kurdish revolutions against the Iraqi regime. The Kurds' relations with Iran are historical and somewhat contradictory, dating back to the seventies of the last century. However, the Kurds still retain their gratitude to Iran Which helped them a lot, during the days of the Kurdish uprising during the previous regime.

After the US-British attack on Iraq in April 2003, the Kurds allied themselves with the attacking countries, in the hope of achieving the Kurdish goals that had begun to loom on the horizon as if they were real and represented in their minimum limits, with effective participation with Shiites and Sunnis in ruling Iraq after the end of the 2003 regime. Al-Alouji, 2004: 195)

In post-occupation Iraq, the Kurds' relationship with Iran and the transitional government in Baghdad was close, and Kurdish leaders occupied major positions in it, trying at the same time to achieve autonomy and perhaps independence as well. I kept

.Iran is supporting its relations with Kurdish leaders from prominent Kurdish political leaders such as "Jalal Talabani" and "Massoud Barzani", and the relationship between them is going in a strategic balance that benefits the interests of both parties. (Boyle, Frances, 2006, 143).

Second: Media, Propaganda and Public Opinion: Iran is engaged in a competition to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis through news programs of news channels with an Iraqi interface - directed in Arabic, in addition to Iranian series and episodes dubbed into Arabic, which reflects Tehran's dead position towards Iraq and the region. However, these propaganda activities had only limited success and failed to compensate for the Iranian actions that generated an anti-Iranian reaction in the Shiite areas. The results of polls since 2003 consistently show that large numbers of Iraqis (including Shiite citizens) believe that Iran has had a "negative influence", for the most part, on Iraqi politics (Ali, Knights, Eisenstadt, 2005: 134-137). (And the formula of governance in Iran is not a viable model in Iraq. This perception still exists despite Iran's media activities.

Third: Exporting the Islamic Revolution:

It has been at the forefront of the Islamic Republic's goals since the Islamic Revolution, making its official ideology take center stage in Shiite communities around the world. Iran is motivated to achieve this goal, as it has supported Iranian religious scholars trained in Qom and imbued with the official ideology concerned with the religious rule, instead of supporting scholars trained in the religious seminaries of Najaf, in addition to that it has generously spent government funds to finance the activities of its politicized scholars. Note that the Najaf school is subject to the hegemony of Iranian influence after the death in 2010 of the great Ayatollah (Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah), an influential Lebanese scholar who had studied in Najaf, and his place was attended by "Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani," the most important member of the Najaf school, and a reference or imitator for perhaps to 80% of the world's Shiites. (Ashkenazcrook, Lisa & Dominic, 2005:138).

Iran seeks to strengthen its presence in Iraq after the departure of the US forces by strengthening its relations with the Shiite militias that supply it | With arms in exchange for her loyalty tomorrow. The most important thing is the ability of those militias to defeat their opponents in the future of Iraq and to remain in power. Despite the attacks launched by the Shiite militias on the American forces, they are directed mainly against the various Sunni forces in the country, which may mobilize

The rest of the Iraqi segments are against it. (Boyle, 2007). Iran has also armed Shiite and Sunni militias as well, and trained and financed them by the agencies affiliated with well-known Iranian organizations such as the "Quds Force" and the "Badr Organization." This is to represent the role of the diplomatic mediator to resolve the crisis of violence. (Mustafa Ali, 2003: 107). Iran has also established tacit ties with Muqtada al-Sadr and even provided the Mahdi Army with logistical and military supplies, equipment, and light and semi-heavy weapons. (Saeed Khodeida Alo, 101: 2007), Iran has incorporated soft power into its comprehensive government approach, to demonstrate its influence in Iraq." It sought to achieve influence in Baghdad by applying protectionist standards and trade policies unfavorable to Iraq, by trying to co-opt or dislodge a multinational network of Shiite clerics in Najaf and Shiite clerics from Iran, and by seeking to influence Iraqi public opinion through media activities. Tehran's display of its influence through militias and rebel groups is becoming increasingly difficult for the Islamic Republic." Ultimately, the extent of Tehran's influence will depend on the security situation in Iraq, the political make-up, and the relationship with the United States, as well as the overall course of Iranian-Arab, and Sunni-relations. Shiites in the Arabian Gulf. (A Mustafa Ali, 2001).

Conclusion and conclusions.

Conclusion :

Since the beginning of the American occupation of Iraq on April 9, 2003, Tehran has worked to expand its influence and tighten its control over all aspects of the state and Iraqi life, for political goals by supporting Islamist and non-Islamic parties and currents loyal to it, to gain power through elections, and to build a military force from its affiliated forces Iran and the political parties affiliated with it to create a state of chaos to lead to sectarian fighting, as well as destroy the Iraqi social and cultural structure, all of which Iran is trying to weaken Iraq militarily, and make it politically subject to Iranian authority, and thus full control of the economy and dumping Iraqi markets with Iranian goods, in light of Economic sanctions by the United States and the West, which made Iraq a flexible outlet for the conduct of its economy, as well as the serious attempt to consolidate economic relations in order to compete on Iraqi markets against other neighboring countries with the approach of the scheduled date for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq at the end of 2011.

Conclusions:

. Before 2003, Iran and Iraq sought to exploit the land and river border problems, the Shatt al-Arab problem, and ethnic and sectarian problems, in the form of international disputes through political and military methods, to expand influence and not repeat the political factor with the advent of the anti-Iran government, and economic and financial cooperation if it was in a crisis between The two countries, with regard to the Iranian revolution, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the American blockade of Iraq, and even the American war on Iraq in 2003, all attitudes towards the other were characterized by cooperation sometimes and conflict at other times, but the conflict represents the most prominent form in the relationship between the two neighboring countries., that the occupation The US Secretary of State for Iraq in 2003, and in the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations: "The war on Iraq was illegal and illegitimate, and it contradicts the Charter of the United Nations." The decision to war on Iraq came according to fabricated documents and reports regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, so it was important for Iran to interfere in the internal politics of Iraq, in addition to knowing that most of Iran's oil wealth is located on the borders in the Ahwaz region.

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